I've noticed several posts wondering where rhizome theory leaves the individual, or at least where exactly this theory manifests itself in "real world."
In the same way that the Haraway essay answered a lot of my questions about what it means to be an individual agent in postmodernity--how agency and the atomizations etc., of postmodernity are fully compatible and not mutually exclusive--I think that essay has a similar clarifying potential for what a rhizomatic person might look like: a cyborg.
I noted a lot of similarities between the two concepts, and I wonder what others think, since there are absolutely some fairly substantive parts of D&G I'm a little foggy on. Both explicitly reject Freudian and Marxist meta-narratives, genealogies, and monad-like individuals in favor of multiplicities, connections, and anti-hierarchically horizontal conceptions of being.
Haraway: "[The cyborg] has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through the final appropriation of all the powers of all the parts into a higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense (150)"; "Our best machines are made of sunshine; they are all light and clean because they are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a section of a spectrum ... Cyborgs are ether, quintessence" (153); "What kind of politics could embrace partial, contradictory, permanently unclosed constructions of the personal and collective selves and still be faithful, effective, and, ironically, socialist-feminist?" (157).
D&G: "Our criticism of these linguistic models is not that they are too abstract, but on the contrary, are not abstract enough, that they do not reach the abstract machine that connects a language to the semantic and pragmatic contents of statements, to collective assemblages of enunciation, to a whole micropolitics of the social field. A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggle" (TP 7).
There are a lot more quotes I could pull, but these struck me as suggestive of the ways in which rhizomes and cyborgs can both be "abstract machines", that state where being consists of a continual middle, of continuing intersections, of being "multiplicities."
Thoughts? How far do you think this parallel can be fairly stretched, and where does it start to break down?